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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis models and analyzes a closed loop supply chain for electronic products 
such as cell phones. In this supply chain, there exists an original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM) who sells new products and collects used products. Also there exists a reseller who 
procures the used products from the OEM. The reseller refurbishes these used products and 
then resells them as refurbished products. Besides reselling, the OEM is assumed to have an 
option to sell the used products to recyclers for recycling. In the thesis, we model this as a 
two-period Stackelberg game with the OEM as the leader and the reseller as the follower 
(OEM-Reseller model). We then compare this model with the centrally coordinated model. 
We solve equilibrium prices, production quantities as well as profits using backwards 
induction in both OEM-Reseller model and centrally coordinated model. Managerial insights 
are derived from numerical analysis. We show that under some conditions, OEM’s profit from 
reselling refurbished products exceeds the loss of profit due to reduced new products sales 
from the competition of refurbished products. That is to say, selling the collected used 
products to the reseller can be a profitable strategy for the OEM. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
By the end of 2006, there are over 233 million cell phones in use in the United States. 
Assuming the average life time of 18 months the annual discard amount is estimated to be 
150 million (INFORM Inc 2008). These end-of-life cell phones contain hazardous materials 
such as lead and nickel. If buried in the landfill or burnt in the incinerator, they impose great 
threat to public safety (Bhuie et al. 2004).Some states such as Maine and California have 
issued environmental laws regarding electronic waste collection and treatment (State of 
Maine 2007, State of California 2003, 2004) to promote collection of end-of-life electronic 
products and to ensure they are treated properly after collection. As part of the corporate 
responsibility (Motorola 2008a), some manufacturers have launched free take back programs 
to collect used products over the country.  
What happens to the used cell phones after they are collected from the customers? 
According to Motorola, these phones are sorted first. Those that are old, damaged or have 
little value are sent for recycling. Phones that have value will be refurbished (Motorola 2005). 
In the recycling process, the used phones are weighed and shredded. The useful materials, 
such as copper, and precious metals (Gold, Silver) are extracted, refined and eventually sold 
at the material market. As for the refurbishing process, there are two levels of refurbishing. If 
the used phones are of high quality and pass call tests, they go through cosmetic repairs and 
are then repackaged and resold. If they fail the call test, the reseller dissemble them and 
repair them as long as it is economic before reselling them as “refurbished” phones (Neira et 
al. 2006). 
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 This thesis models the post-collection treatment in the following way. We assume the 
presence of an OEM and a reseller. The OEM is defined as a company that produces and 
sells its own product under its brand name, such as Motorola, LG, and Nokia (State of 
California SB20, Neira et al. 2004). A reseller is a company that refurbishes and resells used 
products. An example of the reseller is Recellular Inc.. Particularly, the OEM collects used 
phones from the market and sells them to the reseller. The reseller is able to refurbish all 
units purchased from the OEM. The collected phones that are not bought by the reseller will 
be sent for recycling.  
Although many cell phone OEMs claim that they are environment-friendly and 
provide free take-back services, their post-collection treatment methods vary. For example, 
Samsung and Nokia recycle the collected cell phones only. Motorola not only recycles but 
also engages in the reselling business by working with Recellular (Neira et al. 2006).  
 The reason why cell phone OEMs are hesitant about engaging in reselling business 
might be their fear of loss of new product sales from the competition of refurbished products 
(Ferguson and Toktay 2006). Recycling on the other hand, seems to be a safer option for 
these OEMs because the used products are dissembled and scraped, posing no threat to the 
new product sales. For example Lexmark, an American printer manufacturer, collects empty 
printer cartridges by providing a discount on a new cartridge. Instead of remanufacturing 
them, Lexmark recycles them (Ferguson and Toktay 2006). There appears to be limited 
decision frameworks to advise OEMs about the economic viability of the post-collection 
treatment options (Guide and Wassenhove 2001).  
We analyze OEM’s preference for reselling and recycling quantitatively in this thesis. 
We hope to understand what would be the optimal post-collection treatment method for the 
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OEM under different conditions from the market. Specifically, we seek to answer the 
following questions: 
1. Under what condition would the OEM allow reselling refurbished products? 
2. How much collected used products would the reseller procure from the OEM? At 
what price would the OEM charge the reseller for each collected used product? 
3. What would the equilibrium market price for new and refurbished products be? 
The results of this thesis can be used as decision support model for green electronic 
product OEMs who wish to comply with electronic waste treatment policies where improper 
disposal is banned. We find that under some conditions, OEM’s profit from reselling 
refurbished products exceeds the loss of profit due to reduced new products sales from the 
competition of refurbished products. If the customers value more for refurbished products, 
the OEM can benefit from charging higher wholesale price for each collected used product 
and both OEM and reseller would have a higher profit. That is to say, if the market 
configuration falls under these conditions, selling the collected used products to the reseller is 
more profitable for the OEM than selling them to recyclers. 
 The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we show how our model 
is derived and different from previous literature. Chapter 3 presents the assumptions, 
notations and derivation of the OEM-Reseller model (OR model). Conditions under which 
the OEM will allow the reselling of used products are calculated. We solve the equilibrium 
production quantities and prices under each possible condition. After this we prove the 
existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg game in the second period. Then by numerical 
analysis we discuss some managerial insights. In Chapter 4 we analyze the centrally-
coordinated model (CC model), where a central planner sells both new and refurbished 
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products. The OR model is then compared against CC model using numerical examples. 
Chapter 5 concludes our findings in Chapter 3 and 4, and proposes future research ideas, 
such as extending the planning horizon to infinite periods, making collection rate as a 
decision variable, and analyzing government’s environmental policies’ impact on the supply 
chain.  
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CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Product reuse after its end-of-life has received much research attention in the recent 
years. There is extensive literature regarding the relationship among manufacturer, retailer, 
collector, and remanufacturer, analyzing how it influences the retail price, collection rate and 
channel profit (Majumder and Goenevelt 2001, Savaskan et al 2004, Fergusan and Toktay 
2006). 
Many papers assume that customers cannot distinguish a new product from a 
remanufactured product. Typical such products are ink-cartridges and single-use cameras 
(Savaskan 2004). Majumder and Groenvelt (2001) proposed a model where, although the 
customers cannot tell if a product is new or remanufactured by the OEM, they value products 
sold by the OEM more than those sold by the local remanufacturer. Ferguson and Toktay 
(2006) introduced the price-demand function where the customers value new products more 
than remanufactured products. This thesis assumes the customers can distinguish a new 
phone and a refurbished one by having lower willingness-to-pay for refurbished products. 
To capture the essence of a finite lifetime, many authors used two-period model 
(Majumder and Groenevelt 2001, Ferguson and Toktay 2000, Webster and Mitra 2007). For 
products with relatively mature technology such as single use cameras, some literature 
models them by assuming a steady production and return flow of products, hence using a 
steady state model (Savaskan et al. 2004). This thesis uses two-period model to capture the 
fast obsolescence of electronic products. 
Many agents, such as manufacturer, retailer, collector, and remanufacturer are 
involved in product recovery decisions. Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) looked at the 
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competition between the OEM and a local remanufacturer under an exogenously imposed 
returned product allocation mechanism. Savaskan et al. (2004), on the other hand, looked at 
the vertical integration of the recovery supply chain: how would the prices and profits of 
each player change if different collection strategy is implemented. Bhattacharya et al. (2006) 
analyzed how decentralized recovery decision making affects the optimal order quantities a 
retailer orders from the manufacturer. Our model is similar to the Remanufacturer-Separate 
(REMS) configuration in this paper, where manufacturer and retailer make decisions together, 
and remanufacture competes with them. 
In many literatures, the OEM competes with local remanufacturers (Majumder and 
Groenevelt 2001). Ferguson and Toktay (2006) showed that the OEM suffers detrimental 
loss in profit at the presence of an entering remanufacturer. They then proposed and 
compared two preemptive options for the OEM: 1. OEM start remanufacturering; 2. OEM 
collect to deter local remanufacturer’s acquisition of used products. In this thesis we 
proposed a new option: the OEM collects used products, and then sells them to the reseller. 
The OEM benefits from the resale of refurbished products by charging a high wholesale price 
for the reseller’s procurement. We found that this profit may exceed the loss of new product 
sales under some conditions, rendering reselling as a profitable option for the OEM. 
In all the above mentioned literature, Game theory is extensively used. Most of the 
previous literature that uses Cournot model, where OEM and remanufacturer make decisions 
based on the expectation of their opponent’s best responses simultaneously. This thesis, 
however, uses a Stackelberg game to analyze the relationship between the cell phone OEM 
and the reseller. The OEM, having absolute control over the collection of used product, acts 
as the Stackelberg leader and maximizes profit by observing the reseller’s best response 
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function. The OEM first decides on the production quantity and unit wholesale price 
expecting the best response from the reseller. The reseller then makes its move after 
observing the OEM’s decisions to maximize its profit. This game is subject to non-negativity 
constraints of both OEM’s and reseller’s production quantities, and of the inequality 
constraint that the OEM cannot sell to the reseller more than what has been collected.  
To treat electronic wastes safely and economically, many states have passed laws to 
prevent products containing toxic material going into landfill or being incinerated. California 
passed Senate Bill 20 (SB20) and Senate Bill 50 (SB50), and requires manufacturers and 
retailers must provide free product take-back program to customers. Although no federal law 
has been passed, it is likely that each state would come up with its own electronic waste 
treatment law in the future. Our thesis provides decision support for electronic product OEMs 
who wish to comply with these environmental laws. 
Cell phone recovery has been studied many times by researchers. Bhuie et al.(2004)’s 
research provides real life data of the cell phone recycling industry. Guide et al.(2005) 
published a case study of Recellular, the industry leader of cell phone recovery (Recellular 
2008a). Neira et al. (2006) investigated the current cell phone end-of-life management 
practices in the United States. According to Guide (2005) reseller does not collect directly 
from end customers, but procures used products from many sources including airtime 
providers and third party collectors. The reseller then performs testing and economic repair 
before selling the refurbished cell phones back to the U.S. market or exporting them to 
developing countries (Bhuie et al 2004). This thesis assumes that the OEM is the only 
procurement source for the reseller, and hopes to answer how a powerful cell phone 
manufacturer decides whether allow reselling used phone or not. 
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This thesis makes contribution to the literature in following ways. First, it extends 
from the preemptive relationship between manufacturer and reseller, where the manufacturer 
tries to drive the reseller out of the market in fear of competition (Ferguson and Toktay 2006), 
to a model where the manufacturer sells collected products to reseller and generates revenue 
from refurbished phones sales. Second, unlike the common constrained Cournot model 
(Ferguson and Toktay 2006, Oraiopolos 2007), this thesis analyzed the Stackelberg model 
with non-negativity constraints and used product supply constraint of the OEM.  
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CHAPTER 3.  OEM-RESELLER MODEL (OR MODEL) 
Following the lead by Ferguson and Toktay (2006), we propose an OEM-Reseller 
model. In our model, instead of trying to drive the competitor out of the market by collecting 
the used products without remanufacturing, the OEM sells a part of, or all of them to the 
reseller.  
This kind of relationship between two non-cooperative entities in supply chain is rare 
in the previous remanufacturing literature, yet it exists in reality. Webster and Mitra (2007) 
discuss such a configuration of supply chain as part of the individual Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment (WEEE) take-back implementation under the European Union WEEE 
Directive. Many cell phone OEMs such as Motorola, are collecting used cell phones for free 
to meet the environmental legislatures, for example SB20 and SB50 in California. After the 
collection, the OEM will either resell or recycle phones based on the conditions of the market 
(Motorola 2005). Recellular Inc., the biggest used cell phone reseller in the world (Recellular 
2008), acquires these phones from Motorola (Recellular 2007) and service providers such as 
Verizon (Neira 2006). For the OEM, selling to the reseller, although increases competition 
with its new product sales, may still be a more profitable way than recycling given the high 
recycling cost. The objective of our research is to investigate the following questions: 
1) Under what conditions will the OEM choose to sell to the reseller? 
2) How much would the reseller purchase? How much would the OEM charge the 
reseller? What would the market price of new and refurbished phones be? 
In order to answer these questions, we set up a two period model to analyze the 
closed loop supply chain. 
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3.1  Model Assumptions and Notation 
This thesis considers a two-period model with two players: the OEM and the reseller. 
Here OEM is a generalization of the manufacturer and its distribution network, which 
includes retailers and service providers. We made this generalization because these agents 
generally act coordinately in the selling of cell phones (Neira 2006). They achieve profit 
maximization with new product sales only. This is similar to the REMS model in 
Bhattacharya et al.(2006), where the manufacturer and retailer make decisions as a single 
player against a remanufacturer.  
A reseller on the other hand, acquires collected products from the manufacturer, and 
then refurbishes and resells these used products. Karakayali et al.(2007) discussed a similar 
decentralized supply chain consisting of a collector and a remanufacturer. The OEM-Reseller 
model is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Illustration of the OEM-Reseller model 
 
OEM OEM 
reseller 
1nq
2nq1nqτ 2rq
1st Period 2nd Period 
Recycle 
w
1 2n rq qτ −
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In the first period, the OEM sells only new products to the market as a monopolist. 
The OEM decides on the quantity 1nq  to sell. The market price 1np  is given by the inverse 
demand function. There is no competition in this period and only new products are sold in 
the market.  
At the beginning of the second period the OEM collects 1nqτ units of used products 
from the customers. The OEM then sells 2rq  of these used products to the reseller. The 
reseller sells them back to the market after refurbishing (Neira et al. 2006). The OEM 
charges the reseller a unit wholesale price w for each unit procured (Karakayali et al. 2007). 
In this period, the OEM continues to only sell new products to the market. The collected 
products that are not sold to the reseller are sold to the recyclers at the price of R per unit. 
The OEM competes with the reseller in the second period for profit. The OEM, 
having the dominating power over the supply chain, acts as the Stackelberg leader and sets its 
quantity 2nq  and unit wholesale price w first. The reseller then maximizes its profit taking the 
OEM’s decisions 2nq  and w, by setting the procurement and resale quantity 2rq . Notations 
used in this thesis are explained below. 
1nq : quantity of new products sold by the OEM in the first period, scaled to the magnitude 
of the normalized market size 1, 10 1nq≤ ≤  (units); 
2nq : quantity of new products sold by the OEM in the second period, scaled to the 
magnitude of the normalized market size 1, 20 1nq≤ ≤  (units); 
2rq : quantity of refurbished products sold by the reseller in the second period scaled to the 
magnitude of the normalized market size 1, 20 1rq≤ ≤  (units); 
  
 
12
w: unit wholesale price paid by the reseller to the OEM for each used product procured, 
scaled to the magnitude of customer’s maximum willingness-to-pay ($/unit); 
1np : retail price of new products in the first period, scaled to the magnitude of customer’s 
maximum willingness-to-pay, 10 1np≤ ≤  ($/unit); 
2np : retail price of new products in the second period, scaled to the magnitude of 
customer’s maximum willingness-to-pay, 20 1np≤ ≤  ($/unit); 
2rp : retail price of refurbished products in the second period, scaled to the magnitude of 
customer’s maximum willingness-to-pay, 20 1rp≤ ≤  ($/unit); 
nC : marginal production cost for each new product incurred by the OEM, scaled to the 
magnitude of customer’s maximum willingness-to-pay, 0 1nC≤ ≤  ($/unit); 
rC : marginal processing cost for each refurbished product incurred by the reseller, scaled 
to the magnitude of customer’s maximum willingness-to-pay, 0 1rC≤ ≤  ($/unit); 
cC : collection cost for each used product collected by the OEM, scaled to the magnitude 
of customer’s maximum willingness-to-pay, 0 1cC≤ ≤  ($/unit); 
R: price recyclers pay to the OEM for each used product sent for recycling, scaled to the 
magnitude of customer’s maximum willingness-to-pay. The recyclers decides on the value of 
R considering the market price of recycled materials and the recycling costs, to maintain a 
positive profit for each recycled product. R can be both positive and negative. When R is 
negative the recyclers charge OEM a price for each used product sent for recycling. ($/unit); 
ϕ : customers’ scaled willingness-to-pay, 0 1ϕ≤ ≤  ($/unit); 
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δ : relative willingness-to pay, defined as the ratio of refurbished product value to new 
product value perceived by the customers, 0 1δ< <  ; 
τ : collection rate, defined as fraction of 1nq that was collected at the beginning of second 
period, 0 1τ≤ ≤ ; 
1OΠ : OEM’s profit in the first period; 
2OΠ : OEM’s profit in the second period; 
OΠ : OEM’s total profit in two periods, 1 2O O OΠ = Π +Π  ; 
RΠ : reseller’s profit; 
1CΠ : central planner’s profit in the first period;  
2CΠ : central planner’s profit in the second period;  
CΠ : central planner’s profit in two periods, 1 2C C CΠ = Π +Π ;  
2
1
r
n
q
qτ : resell rate, defined as the ratio of quantities of refurbished products sold by the 
reseller to the quantity of used products collected by the OEM, 2
1
0 1r
n
q
qτ≤ ≤ ; 
 In order to model the closed loop supply chain, we made the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1: The OEM-Reseller model is modeled as a two period game. 
In the cell phone industry, when a newly designed product arrives in the market, the 
OEM enjoys the advantage of monopolist for a limited time. During this time, the customers 
have only two options: 1. buy a new product; 2. stay inactive. After some time, those who are 
first to purchase these products would seek to upgrade their gears. Many OEMs provide a 
discount incentive when customers return their used products at the purchase of a new one to 
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as a promotion tool (Ray et al. 2005). From this point on, used products start to enter the 
market, giving those who cannot afford a new phone a cheaper option of getting a 
refurbished one. A two period model was able to capture the finite product life of electronics 
products without adding extra complexities. The first period models the monopolistic 
scenario, and second period models the competition between new and refurbished products in 
the market. Many papers on remanufacturing utilized the two-period assumption, such as 
Majumda and Groenevelt (2001), Debo et al. (2005), and Furguson and Toktay(2006).  
Assumption 2: Useful lifespan of each product is one period. The consumers will re-
enter the market after a period of usage of the products. Therefore, the market size is the 
same for period 1 and period 2.  
This is especially true in the cell phone industry in the United States. After the service 
contract, typically 18 to 24 months, high end customers will seek to purchase a new phone by 
reentering the market (Neira et al. 2006). This assumption is appropriate if we carefully set 
the length of the period to be sufficient for the life span of an average cell phone. By 
assuming a constant market size we are able to derive inverse demand functions.  
Assumption 3: Customer willingness-to-pay ϕ  for new products is heterogeneous and 
uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1]. 
We made this assumption to capture the distinctive nature of each customer, who has 
a various income and purchase behavior (Ferguson and Toktay 2006, Ray et al. 2005). 
Although in real life the consumers’ willingness to pay may be of some complicated 
distribution, uniform distribution captures the essence of diversity in consumers’ purchasing 
behavior and preferences, without adding unnecessary computational complexity. In fact, this 
has been a classical assumption in many economic literatures. 
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 Because of this assumption, every price and cost parameter is scaled to the magnitude 
of customer’s maximum willingness-to-pay. For example, the marginal production cost of 
new product nC  should satisfy 0 1nC< <  because the customers will pay at most 1 for a unit 
of new product, in order for the OEM to profit the cost should be smaller than the price. 
Assumption 4: Each customer’s willingness-to-pay for a refurbished product is a 
fraction δ of his/her willingness-to-pay for a new product. 0<δ <1 
The customers perceive reduced quality for a refurbished product. These refurbished 
products are distinctively labeled as “refurbished”. The relative willingness-to-payδ can be 
viewed as the substitutability of refurbished products to new products. If a customer’s 
willingness-to-pay for a new product isϕ , then his/her willingness-to-pay for a refurbished 
product isδϕ . That is to say, customers value refurbished products more when δ is large. 
When 1δ = , refurbished products become perfect substitute of new products. Unlike products 
such as single use cameras or ink cartridges studied in many remanufacturing literatures, for 
instance in Savaskan et al.(2004), the customers can tell the difference between a new cell 
phone and a refurbished one. Due to possible concerns such as battery performance and style, 
customers value less for a refurbished cell phone. Under this assumption the new product is a 
perfect substitute to the refurbished product, while the refurbished one is an imperfect 
substitute to the new one (Ferguson and Toktay 2006, Debo et al. 2005). 
To derive the inverse demand function we assume that each customer buys and keeps 
only 1 product at a time. Normalizing the market size to 1 we can derive the simple linear 
inverse demand function: 
1 1 1( ) 1n n np q q= −      (3.1) 
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2 2 2 2 2( , ) 1n n r n rp q q q qδ= − −     (3.2) 
2 2 2 2 2( , ) (1 )r n r n rp q q q qδ= − −     (3.3) 
 The derivation of the inverse demand function is given in the Appendix B. 
Assumption 5: OEM collects and reseller purchases used products from OEM. 
OEM, together with its distribution network, such as service providers and retailers, 
are able to reach into the market and acquire used cell phones. Cell phone OEMs such as 
Motorola provides a prepaid envelope addressed to its recycling center to the customers that 
comes with a new phone (Motorola 2008b).OEMs also host active recycle programs such as 
Motorola’s RaceToRecycle (Motorola 2005) to collect used phones by providing rewards or 
incentives. Service providers such as Verizon (2008) and retailers such as Bestbuy (2007) 
provide drop boxes in store and the customers can return their used cell phones at no cost. 
Resellers, on the other hand, are far less known to the customers compared to the OEM. 
According to a case study on Recellular, the majority of its procurement comes from the 
service providers.(Guide et al. 2005) Robotis et al.(2004) argues that the reseller can decide 
the procurement quantity from various sources.  Therefore, we made this assumption that the 
OEM acts as the collector, and reseller decides how much to purchase from the OEM. 
Similar assumption has been made by Webster and Mitra(2007). 
Assumption 6: OEM sells only new products in both periods. 
Although remanufacturing is gradually recognized as a profit generating sector 
companies such as Caterpillar (Forbes 2005), many manufacturers, especially cell phone 
OEMs, are concerned with the damage from refurbished products to the new product sales. 
At the moment, it is not observed that a cell phone OEM directly engage in refurbishing and  
reselling of used products. There are many possible reasons. For example the refurbishing 
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process is sometimes very different from the manufacturing process, resulting in a high set 
up cost. Cell phone OEMs need to focus on the core business that guarantees high profit to 
satisfy the stakeholders. The OEM wouldn’t engage in product recovery activities before 
completely understanding its costs and benefits (Guide and Wassenhove 2001). 
Assumption 7: Collected products are in good condition and have resale value. The 
reseller can refurbish and resell all the products procured from the OEM. 
This assumption is justifiable in two folds. First the OEM as the collector can control 
the quality of collected used products by choosing the collection channel and return 
incentives. Second, the reseller maintains a quality standard for the procurement from OEM. 
According to Neira et al. (2006), the procurements from the service providers are usually in 
good condition. Motorola provides trade-in programs to acquire used phones of good 
condition with a higher incentive captured in the collection cost in our model (Motorola 
2008c). The reseller ensures the procurement from the collectors is of high resale value 
(Guide and Wassenhove 2001). 
Assumption 8: Only the OEM knows the amount of used phones collected at the 
beginning of the second period. All other variables and parameters are known to both players. 
Because of the complexity and randomness of customer’s returning behavior it is hard 
for the reseller to observe the collected quantity by the OEM. Even the OEM cannot predict 
precisely how much will be collected. We therefore set the collection rate τ  as a given 
parameter instead of as a decision variable. From this assumption the OEM faces the used 
product supply constraint that it cannot sell to the reseller more than the amount of collected 
used products. The OEM sets the unit wholesale price w to be high enough to satisfy this 
inequality constraint. Other variables, such as production quantities in each period are known 
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by both players. OEM knows how much the reseller will sell because reseller procures from 
the OEM. The reseller on the other hand, can observe OEM’s production quantities because 
the OEM is usually a public company that publishes annual reports. Complete information is 
assumed in many previous literatures (Ferguson and Toktay 2006). 
3.2  Model Derivation 
OEM maximizes the total profits in both periods assuming the equilibrium in second 
period will come to pass. We analyze the model by using backwards induction, starting from 
the second period. 
3.2.1 Second Period 
In the second period, this is a Stackelberg game between the OEM and the reseller. In 
a general two-player Stackelberg game, player 1 (Stackelberg leader) chooses his/her strategy 
1x first. Then player 2 (Stackelberg follower) observes the leader’s choicex1 and chooses 
his/her strategy x2.  To determine the Stackelberg equilibrium ( * *1 2,x x ) , we first determine 
player 2’s strategy *2 1( )x x  that maximizes his/her profit for any given 1x by player 1 .  Here 
*
2 1( )x x  is called the best response function. We then determine the player 1’s strategy 
*
1x  that 
maximizes his profits *1 2 1( , ( ))x x xπ . This method is called backwards induction (Cachon and 
Netessine 2004). 
Specifically, in our model the OEM as the leader first decides on 2nq and w. The 
reseller, as the follower, takes 2nq and w as given and decides procurement quantity 2rq  to 
maximize reseller’s profit. 
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2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
Max  ( ( , ) )
                 ( (1 ) )
r
R r n r r rq
n r r r
p q q C w q
q q C w qδ
Π = − −
= − − − −
    (3.4) 
s.t. 2 0rq ≥         (3.5) 
The OEM, taking the best response from the reseller *2 2 1( , | )r n nq q w q , maximizes 
its profit by setting the production quantity 2nq  and the unit wholesale price w. 
2 ,
* *
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2
* *
2 2 2 1 2 1 2
Max  ( ( , ) ) ( )
                 (1 ) ( )
n
O n n r n n c n r n rq w
n r n n c n r n r
p q q C q C q wq R q q
q q C q C q wq R q q
τ τ
δ τ τ
Π = − − + + −
= − − − − + + −
  (3.6) 
s.t. *2 1r nq qτ≤ , 2 0nq ≥       (3.7) 
Here the OEM achieves revenue of 2 2 2( , )n n rp q q  for each new product sold in 
the second period. The OEM also invests 1c nC qτ  in collecting used products. The OEM 
then sells these collected products, receiving *2rwq  from the reseller and 
*
1 2( )n rR q qτ −  
from the recyclers. Notice the inequality constraint 2 1r nq qτ≤  in (3.7). This is due to the 
used product supply constraint of the OEM: OEM cannot sell to the reseller more than 
what has been collected. The OEM sets its price w so that the demand from reseller *2rq  
does not exceed the amount OEM collected at the beginning of the second period. 
Reseller’s Move. Let’s first derive reseller’s best response function. The 
Lagrangean is 
2 2 2 2[ (1 ) ]R n r r r rL q q C w q qδ μ= − − − − +    (3.8) 
First Order Necessary Condition (FONC): 
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2 2
2
2
2 0
0
0
R
r n r
r
r
L C w q q
q
q
δ δ δ μ
μ
μ
∂ = − − + − − + =∂
=
≥
   (3.9) 
The Second Order Sufficient Condition (SOSC):             
 
2
2
2
2
2R
rq
δ∂ Π = −∂                       (3.10) 
is satisfied because 0 1δ< < , therefore 2 0δ− < , indicating the reseller’s profit is strictly 
concave in 2rq . 
 Based on whether the constraint (3.5) is inactive or active, there are two possible 
cases.  
Case 1: 2rq >0 
 Solving FONC(3.9) we have μ =0, and 22 2
r n
r
C w qq δ δδ
+ − += − . 
 Condition: 2 0r nC w qδ δ+ − + <  
Case 2: 2rq =0 
 Solving FONC(3.9) we have  2rq =0, 2(1 ) 0r nC w qμ δ= + − − ≥ . 
 Condition: 2 0r nC w qδ δ+ − + ≥  
 So the reseller’s best response function can be written as: 
 * 22 2 1( , | ) 2
r n
r n n
C w qq q w q δ δδ
+ − += −     (3.11) 
 if 2 0r nC w qδ δ+ − + <      (3.12) 
or *2 2 1( , | ) 0r n nq q w q =       (3.13) 
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 if 2 0r nC w qδ δ+ − + ≥      (3.14) 
OEM’s Move. We now proceed to solve for the optimal *2nq  and 
*w that maximize 
OEM’s profit in the second period. The Langrangean of OEM is: 
* * *
2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2(1 ) ( ) ( )O n r n n c n r n r n r nL q q C q C q wq R q q q q qδ τ τ λ τ ρ= − − − − + + − + − +
 (3.15) 
FONC: 
2 2
2
*
2 1 2
0, 0
0, 0
0, ( ) 0
O O
n
n n r
q w
q q q
λ ρ
ρ λ τ
∂Π ∂Π= =∂ ∂
≥ ≥
= − =
     (3.16) 
There are 6 possible cases based on the combination of the three inequality 
constraints (3.5) and (3.7). We now solve for the solution under each case. Notice that 
1 0nq >  in order for our discussion to be meaningful. This is because if 1 0nq =  then the 
model becomes such that OEM does not produce in the first period, and therefore no used 
phones are collected in the second period. This is not optimal because the OEM can make 
more profit by selling new products in both periods.  
Case1: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< > >  
Case2: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< = >  
Case3: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ= = >  
Case4: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ= > >  
Case5: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< > =  
Case6: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< = =  
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When 2 0r nC w qδ δ+ − + < , * 22 2 1( , | ) 2
r n
r n n
C w qq q w q δ δδ
+ − += − , (3.15) becomes 
2
2 2
1
1 ( ( 2 ) (2 2 2 )
2
( )( ) 2 ( )        )
O n n n r
r n c
L q q C C R
C w R w q R C
δ δ λ ρ
δ λ τ δ λ
δ
= − + + − + + − + +
+ − − + + + −+
  (3.17) 
SOSC: 
2 2
2
2 2
2 2
2
2
2 0
10
O O
n n
O O
n
L L
q q w
H
L L
w q w
δ
δ
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ − +⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥−∂ ∂ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
    
 (3.18) 
Since 0 1δ< < , 2 δ− + <0, 1δ− <0, and 
2 0H δδ
−= > , the Hessian is negative-
definitive. Hence 2OΠ  is strictly concave in 2nq  and w when 2 0r nC w qδ δ+ − + < .Case1 to 
Case 4 satisfy this condition (3.12). 
Case1: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< > >  
From FONC (16) we have 0, 0λ ρ= =  
* 1 ( )
2 r
w R Cδ= + −      (3.19) 
*
2
2 2
4 2
n r
n
C C Rq δδ
− + + −= −     (3.20) 
Substitute (3.19) and (3.20) into (3.11) we have 
*
2 24 2
n r
r
C R Cq δ δ δ
− −= −      (3.21) 
Conditions: 
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from (3.12), 0
2
r nC R Cδ
δ
+ − <− ,  
so n rR C Cδ< −      (3.22)  
from 2 1r nq qτ< , 1 24 2
n r
n
C R Cq δτ δ δ
− −> −       
 (3.23) 
from 2 0nq > , 2 2n rR C Cδ> + − −      (3.24) 
from (3.22) 2 0rq > is satisfied. 
In conclusion the conditions for case 1 to happen is  
1 24 2
n r
n
C R Cq δτ δ δ
− −> −  and 2 2n r n rC C R C Cδ δ+ − − < < −   (3.25) 
Case2: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< = >  
From FONC (3.16) We have 0λ =  
* 1 ( )
2 r
w R Cδ= + −      (3.26) 
from 2 0nq =  we have 1 ( 2 2 )2 n rC C Rρ δ= − + − − +  
*
2 4
r
r
R Cq δ δ
− −=      (3.27) 
Conditions: 
From 2 1r nq qτ< and (27),  1 4
r
n
R Cq δτ δ
− −>     (3.28) 
From 2 0rq > , we have rR Cδ< −      (3.29) 
From 0ρ ≥ , 2 2n rR C Cδ≤ + − −      (3.30) 
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Condition (3.12) becomes 1 ( ) 0
2 r
C R δ+ − <  is satisfied from (3.29) 
Since if (3.30) is satisfied, (3.29) is met, the conditions for case 2 to happen is: 
1 4
r
n
R Cq δτ δ
− −>  and 2 2n rR C Cδ≤ + − −    (3.31) 
Case3: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ= = >  
From FONC(3.16),  
11 2n nC qρ δτ= − + +      (3.32) 
14r nC R qλ δ δτ= − − + −     (3.33) 
and  
*
12r nw C qδ δτ= − + −      (3.34) 
* *
2 2 10,n r nq q qτ= =       
Conditions: 
From 0ρ ≥  and (32), 0λ ≥  and (33) we have 
1
1
2 4
n r
n
C R Cq δτδ δ
− − −≤ ≤     (3.35) 
 Condition (3.12) becomes 12 0nqδτ− <  is satisfied because 1 0nq > .In order for (3.35) 
to hold we must have 2 2n rR C Cδ≤ + − − . Therefore, the conditions for case3 to exist is  
1
1
2 4
n r
n
C R Cq δτδ δ
− − −≤ ≤  and 2 2n rR C Cδ≤ + − −    (3.36) 
Case4: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ= > >  
From FONC (3.17) we have 0, 0ρ λ= ≥  
1( 2(2 ) )r n nC R C qλ δ δ τ= − − + − −     (3.37) 
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*
2 1
1 (1 2 )
2n n n
q C qδτ= − −      (3.38) 
*
1
1 ( 2 (1 2(2 ) ))
2 r n n
w C C qδ δ τ= − + + − −    (3.39) 
Conditions: 
(3.12) is equivalent to 2 1 0r nq qτ= >  is satisfied. 
*
2 0nq > , from (3.38) 1 1 2
n
n
Cqτ δ
−<     (3.40) 
0λ ≥ and (3.37) 1 24 2
n r
n
C R Cq δτ δ δ
− −≤ −     (3.41) 
from (3.41) we have 0n rC R Cδ − − > , therefore n rR C Cδ< −  
So (3.40) and (3.41) can be rewritten as 
1
1
2
n
n
Cqτ δ
−<  if 2 2n rR C Cδ≤ + − −             
1 24 2
n r
n
C R Cq δτ δ δ
− −≤ −  if 2 2n r n rC C R C Cδ δ+ − − < < −   (3.42) 
Now let’s consider when condition (3.14) is satisfied, then *2 2 1( , | ) 0r n nq q w q = .Only 
two cases under this category. 
Case5: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< > =  
from FONC(3.16) we know 10, 0λ μ= =  
*
2
1
2
n
n
Cq −=         (3.43) 
So 2 0nq >  is always satisfied because 0 1nC< <  
2 1r nq qτ<  is met too because 2 0rq =  
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The only constraint for this case to hold is condition (3.12): 
1 (1 )
2 n r
w C Cδ≥ + −      (3.44) 
Case6: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< = =  
From FONC (3.16) 0, 0λ ρ= ≥  
From 2 0nq = , which is equivalent to 1 (1 ) 02 nC ρ− + = . This is impossible because 
nC <1 and 0ρ ≥ . Therefore the FONC is not met in this case, this means that this case will 
not hold. 
Notice that, case 1-4 are divided by mutually exclusive boundaries consisting of 
values of R and 1nqτ . Case 5, on the other hand, is not bounded by and limits on R and 
1nqτ . That is to say, given any value of R and 1nqτ , as long as condition(14) is satisfied, 
the optimal solution would be that of Case5. 
OEM needs to compare its maximum profit between that in Case1-4 when 
condition(3.12) is met, and the profit from Case5 when condition(3.12) is not met. It can be 
shown that when n rR C Cδ≤ − , the profit the OEM can get from setting its w to be greater 
than1/ 2(1 )n rC Cδ+ − , is smaller than that described in each case where condition (3.12) is 
met. That is to say, only when n rR C Cδ≥ −  would case 5 be optimal for OEM. To better 
explain the mutually exclusive boundaries we propose the following proposition. 
The results can be shown in the following table.  
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Proposition 1: There are two threshold values of R: lower threshold 
value 2 2n rL C Cδ= + − − , and higher threshold value n rH C Cδ= − .When R L≤ , the OEM 
might stop making new products in the second period and profit only through selling to the 
reseller. When L R H< < , both new and refurbished products will be in the market. 
When R H≥ , the OEM will recycle all the collected products, thus excluding the reseller 
from the market. The optimal solutions in second period are shown in Table 2, 3, and 4.  
Table 2. Solution when R L≤  in OR model 
Case 1nqτ  *2nq  *2rq  *w  
4 1
1
2
n
n
Cqτ δ
−<  11 (1 2 )2 n nC q δτ− −  1nqτ  1
1 ( 2 (1 2(2 ) ))
2 r n n
C C qδ δ τ− + + − −
3 11 2 4
n r
n
C R Cq δτδ δ
− − −≤ ≤  0 1nqτ  12r nC qδ δτ− + −  
2 1 4
r
n
R Cq δτ δ
− −>  0 
4
rC R δ
δ
+ −− 1 ( )
2 r
R Cδ+ −  
 
Table 3. Solution when L R H< <  in OR model 
Case 1nqτ  *2nq  *2rq  *w  
4 1 4
r
n
R Cq δτ δ
− −≤  11 (1 2 )2 n nC q δτ− − 1nqτ  1
1 ( 2 (1 2(2 ) ))
2 r n n
C C qδ δ τ− + + − −
1 1 4
r
n
R Cq δτ δ
− −>  2 2
4 2
n rC C R δ
δ
− + + −
− 24 2
n rC R Cδ
δ δ
− −
−
1 ( )
2 r
R Cδ+ −  
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Table 4. Solution when R H≥  in OR model 
Case 1nqτ  *2nq  *2rq  *w  
5 any value 
1 (1 )
2 n
C−  0 any w≥ 1/ 2(1 )n rC Cδ+ −  
 
3.2.2 First Period 
Now that we found the two plays’ equilibrium in the second period, we are able to 
take this information to the first stage and solve for the optimal *1nq . 
 The OEM tries to maximize its total profit in two periods. Its optimization 
problem can be formulated as: 
1
* * * * * * *
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2Max  ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )
n
O O n n n n n r n n c n r n rq
q q C q q q C q C q wq R q qδ τ τΠ +Π = − − + − − − − + + −
 (3.45) 
 It is not prevalent in the cell phone industry that, the OEM will stop selling new 
products because of the competition from refurbished products ( 2 0nq = ). In order to study 
the competition between the OEM and the reseller, we focus on the case when both new and 
refurbished products are available in the market ( 2 2n r n rC C R C Cδ δ+ − − < < − ), as 
depicted in table 3. 
It can be observed that there is a threshold value of 1 4
r
n
R Cq δ τδ
− −= . When 1 1n nq q≤ , 
the OEM will sell all the collected products to reseller; When 1 1n nq q> , OEM will sell a 
fraction of the collected products to reseller and recycle the rest of them. 
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 First we need to check that *2 1( )O nqΠ  is continuous at the boundary 1nq .In the 
region 1 1n nq q≤ ,  
* 2 2
2 1
1( ) ( 2 2 ( ) ( 2 2 ( 2 )))
4( 2 )O n r n r c r n n
q C R C C C C R C C Cnδ δ δ δ δδ δΠ = − + + − + − + − + − − + +− +
(3.46) 
In the region 1 1n nq q> , the limit of *2OΠ  at 1nq  is 
* 2 2
2 1
1( ) ( 2 2 ( ) ( 2 2 ( 2 )))
4( 2 )O n r n r c r n n
q C R C C C C R C C Cnδ δ δ δ δδ δΠ = − + + − + − + − + − − + +− +
(3.47) 
. (3.46) and (3.47) are the identical, so *2 1( )O nqΠ is continuous at 1nq . 
When 1 1n nq q≤ ,
*
2
1
1
( ( 2 ( 2 ) ))O c r n n
n
C C C q
q
τ δ δ τ∂Π = − − + + − +∂ , at 1nq ,  
*
2
1 1
1
( ) ( ( 2 ( 2 ) )) ( )O n c r n n c
n
q C C C q R C
q
τ δ δ τ τ∂Π = − − + + − + = −∂  (3.48) 
 
When 1 1n nq q> ,  
*
2
1
( )O c
n
R C
q
τ∂Π = −∂ .    (3.49) 
(3.48) is equivalent to (3.49). Therefore, not only is *2 1( )O nqΠ  continuous in 1nq , it is also 
differentiable. 
Lemma 1. *2 1( )O nqΠ  is concave in 1nq . 
  
 
31
Proof: When 1 1n nq q≤ , * 2 2 22 1 1 11( ) (1 ) ( ) ( 2 )4O n n n c r n nq C q C C C qδ τ δ δτΠ = − − + − + − +  is strictly 
concave in 1nq .when 1 1n nq q> , 
* 2
2 1 1
1( ) (2(1 ) ( )( 2 ) 4 ( )( 2 ) )
4(2 )O n n r r n n c
q C C R C R C q C Rδ δ δ δ δ δτδ δΠ = − + + − + + − + − − +−
is linear in 1nq . 
2 *
2 1
2
1
( )
0
O n
n
q
q
∂ Π
≤∂  in both regions of 1nq , therefore 
*
2 1( )O nqΠ  is concave. 
Lemma 2: *1 2O OΠ +Π is strictly concave in 1nq . 
Proof: We have proved that *2OΠ is differentiable and concave. Because 
2
1
2
1
2 0O
nq
∂ Π = − <∂ ,
2 *
2 1
2
1
( )
0
O n
n
q
q
∂ Π
≤∂ , 
2 *
1 2 1
2
1
( ( ))
0
O O n
n
q
q
∂ Π +Π
<∂ . So 
*
1 2O OΠ +Π  is strictly concave. 
Now let’s solve the maximization problem of *1 2O OΠ +Π .The slope of *1 2O OΠ +Π  at 
1nq  is: 
21 2
r n
n c
C R CC C R δτ τ δτ δ τ
+ −− − + + −     (3.50) 
 If(3.50)≤0, which is equivalent to  
2( (( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ( 2 ) ))) / ( 1 ( 2 ) )r c nR C C Cδ δ τ τ δ τ δ δτ≤ + − + − + + − + − + − + − +  (3.51) 
then the optimal *1 1n nq q≤ . 
Solving 
*
1 2 1
1
( ( ))
0
O O n
n
q
q
∂ Π +Π
=∂ we have 
*
1 2
1 ( )
2 2( 2 )
n c r n
n
C C C Cq δ τδ δτ
− + + + −= − + − +    (3.52) 
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and 
* *
1 2O OΠ +Π =
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 (2 2 2 2 ( 1 )
(4 8 4 )
2 (1 ( 1 ) ) 2 (2 2 ( 1 ) ( 1 )))
r c r c r
n n c r
C C C C C
C C C C
τ τ τ δτ δ τ τ τδτ δ τ
δ τ τ δτ δτ δ τ τ δτ τ δτ
− + + + − + − ++ −
+ + − + − − + − + − + + − +
 (3.53) 
If 2( (( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ( 2 ) ))) / ( 1 ( 2 ) )r c nR C C Cδ δ τ τ δ τ δ δτ> + − + − + + − + − + − + − +  
then the optimal *1 1n nq q> . Similarly from 
*
1 2 1
1
( ( ))
0
O O n
n
q
q
∂ Π +Π
=∂  we can find 
*
1
1 (1 ( ) )
2n n c
q C R C τ= − + −     (3.54) 
* *
1 2O OΠ +Π =
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 ( 2 4( 1 ) 2 2
4( 2 )
2 4 2( 1 )( )( 2 ) ( ) ( 2 ) )
r r n n r n
n n n c c
C C R R C C C C R
C C C C R C R
δ δ δδ δ
δ δ δ δ δτ δ δτ
− − − − − + + + +− +
− + + − + − − + + − − +
 
   (3.55) 
 
Proposition 2. If 2( (( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ( 2 ) ))) / ( 1 ( 2 ) )r c nR C C Cδ δ τ τ δ τ δ δτ≤ + − + − + + − + − + − + − + , 
then *1 2
1 ( )
2 2( 2 )
n c r n
n
C C C Cq δ τδ δτ
− + + + −= − + − + . Otherwise 
*
1
1 (1 ( ) )
2n n c
q C R C τ= − + − . 
 Detailed results are made in the form of table in Appendix A. 
3.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Stackelberg Equilibrium 
As demonstrated in section 3.2, the second period is a Stackelberg game between the 
OEM and the reseller. We have found the equilibrium under five mutually exclusive 
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conditions in Table1. Now let’s prove the existence and uniqueness of this Stackelberg 
equilibrium. 
According to Simaan and Cruz (1973), a sufficient condition for the existence of a 
Stackelberg equilibrium is the continuous objective functions if the both the leader’s and the 
follower’s decision sets are compact. A sufficient condition for uniqueness of Stackelberg 
equilibrium is the concavity of the leader’s profit function (Cachon and Netessine 2004). 
3.3.1 Proof of Existence 
It is easy to understand why the OEM’s decisions 2nq  and w, and the reseller’s 
decision 2rq  are compact (i.e. the feasible sets are closed and bounded). For example, the 
OEM cannot set its production quantity in second period 2nq  to be less than zero, nor can it 
set to be too high because over production will decrease the retail price 2np to zero, which 
leads to zero profit. In fact, in most literature about Stackelberg equilibrium each player’s 
feasible action sets are assumed to be compact. We focus on the continuity of the objective 
functions of the two players. 
 First let’s look at the reseller’s objective function (3.4). This is a continuous function 
in 2rq in the feasible range of 2 0rq ≥ . Then we can look at the OEM’s objective function 
(3.6). There are two forms with different ranges of w, respectively. 
Case 1: 2 0r nC w qδ δ+ − + <                (3.56) 
 Substitute (3.11) in (3.6) we have 
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2
2 2 2
1
1 ( ( 2 ) (2 2 )
2
( )( ) 2 ( )          )
                 
O n n n r
r n c
q q C C R
C w R w q R C
δ δ
δ τ δ
δ
Π = − + + − + + −
+ − − + −+    (3.57) 
Case 2: 2 0r nC w qδ δ+ − + ≥               (3.58) 
Substitute (3.13) in (3.6) we have 
2 2 2 1(1 ) ( )O n n n c nq C q R C qτΠ = − − + −     (3.59) 
Condition (3.56) can be re-written as 2n rw q Cδ δ< − −  and (3.58) as 
2n rw q Cδ δ≥ − − . Given and 2 0nq ≥ , there is a boundary value of 2n rw q Cδ δ= − −  that if 
w w< , the OEM’s objective function is (3.57), and if w w≥  the objective function is (3.59).  
Substitute w with w  in (3.57) we have: 
2 2 2 1(1 ) ( )O n n n c nq C q R C qτΠ = − − + −     (3.60) 
(3.60) is identical to (3.59). That is to say, the OEM’s objective function 2OΠ  is 
continuous in w and 2nq . Therefore, the objective functions of the follower and of the leader 
have been proved to be continuous, this proved the existence of the Stackelberg Equilibrium. 
3.3.2 Proof of Uniqueness 
Now let us look at the uniqueness of the Stackelberg Equilibrium. In Case 1, the 
Hessian matrix is: 
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2 2
2 2
2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2
2
2 0
10
O O
n n
O O
n
q w q
H
q w w
δ
δ
⎡ ⎤∂Π ∂Π − +⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥−∂Π ∂Π ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
     
 (3.61) 
Since 0 1δ< < , 2 δ− + <0, 1δ− <0, and 
2 0H δδ
−= > , the Hessian is negative-
definitive. Hence 2OΠ  is strictly concave in 2nq  and w in this case. 
In Case 2, the Hessian matrix becomes: 
2 2
2 2
2
2 2
2 2
2 2
2
2
2 0
0 0
O O
n n
O O
n
q w q
H
q w w
⎡ ⎤∂Π ∂Π⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥∂Π ∂Π ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
      
 (3.62) 
-2<0, H =0, the Hessian is semi-negative-definite. Therefore, 2OΠ  is concave in 2nq  
and w in this case. 
In conclusion, since the leader’s profit 2OΠ  is concave in both cases, the Stackelberg 
equilibrium is unique. 
3.4  Numerical Examples and Sensitivity Analysis 
 We examine our results by using empirical data. We choose Motorola RAZR V3 
as our research object. At MOTO Store a new V3 is sold at $170 (MOTO Store 2008). 
On Recellular.com a used RAZR V3 is sold at $31 (Recellular 2008b).The 6% 
collection rate is of the same magnitude to the published 3.32% data in 2006 (Motorola 
2008d). We use $300 as the maximum willingness-to-pay by customers. Recall our 
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assumption of customer’s willingness-to-pay for new products uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 1. Values of prices and costs should be scaled down to the magnitude of 
[0, 1]. Therefore, we divide these values by the maximum willingness-to-pay of $300. 
In addition to that, we assume the customers’ willingness-to-pay for a refurbished 
product is 30% of that for a new product. The values of the parameters are therefore: 
 nC =$60/300=0.2, rC =$6/300=0.02, cC =$6/300=0.02, δ =0.3, τ :=0.06, 
R=$3/300=0.01 
 From proposition 2，substituting the above values of the parameters yields 
 2np =0.6*300=$180, 2rp =0.175*300=$52.5, 1np =0.6001*300=$180.1, 
w=0.148*300=$44.3. This is close to real life data. We chose the price paid by the 
recyclers for each unit of used product R, and customer’s relative willingness to pay 
δ for the sensitivity analysis because 1.) R directly affects OEM’s preferences of resell 
and recycle, and 2) δ captures the competition between new products and refurbished 
products.  
3.4.1 Variation with R 
 We use the same set of parameter values: nC =$60/300=0.2, rC =$6/300=0.02, 
cC =$6/300=0.02, δ =0.3, τ =0.06 and we relax the value of R. From proposition 1 we 
know when R≤ -1.32, the OEM might stop producing new products in the second 
period. When -1.32<R<0.04, both new and refurbished products exist in the market. 
When R≥0.04, OEM does not send any collected used products to the reseller, so the 
reseller is forced to quit the market. Let us focus on the case when both products exist 
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in the market. We increase R from 0 to 0.04 and see how the equilibrium resell 
rate, 1 , 2 , 2 ,n n rp p p w and 2,o rΠ Π  change accordingly. 
 
Figure 2 Resell rate with changing R 
We can observe a threshold value of R =0.016.When R R<  the OEM sells all 
the collected products to the reseller, i.e. 2 1r nq qτ= , no products are sent for recycling. 
When R R≥ , the OEM sells a fraction of collected products to the reseller, and sells the 
rest of them to the recyclers. That is to say, when recyclers pay more for per used 
product, the OEM has the incentive to recycle more to earn profits from recycling the 
collected products. This results in a decreased resell rate when R increases. If R 
continues to increase to the boundary value of 0.04, the OEM will sell all the collected 
products to the recyclers and the resell rate becomes zero. 
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Figure 3 Price of new products in first period with changing R 
 The price of new products in the first period decreases linearly when R> R . This 
is because the OEM acts strategically. As R increases, recycling becomes more 
attractive. When R> R , the OEM starts to sell to the recyclers. Note that the OEM still 
needs to satisfy the reseller’s demand for used products. Therefore, the OEM would 
increase the production quantity in the first period to make profit from recycling in 
addition to profits from selling to the reseller. As the production quantity increases, the 
price is decreased in the first period. 
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
R
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
p2n
 
Figure 4 Price of new products in the second period with changing R 
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 It is very interesting to see the price to new products in the second period 
remains constant with regard to R. When R increases, recycling becomes more 
attractive to reselling for the OEM. As a result, the new product sales 2nq  increases yet 
refurbished product sales 2rq  decreases. Recall the inverse demand function 
2 2 2 2 2( , ) 1n n r n rp q q q qδ= − − . Increased 2nq  and decreased 2rq  keep 2np  constant. One 
possible explanation is that, since OEM knows new phones produced in the second 
period would no longer be of salvage value when they are returned, the OEM does not 
have the incentive to sell more to acquire additional value after the second period. 
Therefore the price to new products in the second period does not change to R.  
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
R
0.175
0.176
0.177
0.178
0.179
p2r
 
Figure 5 Price of refurbished products in second period with changing R 
 Compared to 2np , price of refurbished product 2rp  is directly affected by R When R 
increases, the OEM will want to sell less to the the reseller by charging a higher unit 
wholesale price. As the procurement cost of the reseller increase, the price of refurbished 
products increases as well.  
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Figure 6 Unit wholesale price w with changing R 
This figure illustrates that when R is large, the OEM will increase its unit 
wholesale price w to deter reseller’s participation in the market. Accordingly, the price 
of refurbished products in the second period will increase as illustrated in Figure 5. 
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 R
0.32025
0.3203
0.32035
ΠO
 
Figure 7 OEM’s total profit from two periods with changing R 
Now let us consider how OEM’s total profit from two periods 1 2o o oΠ = Π +Π  
changes when R increases. When R is small such that R R<  the OEM’s total profit 
stays constant. This is because the price the recyclers offer is not high enough to attract 
OEM to sell used products to. The OEM’s profit from collected used product comes 
only from the reseller. Therefore the OEM’s total profit is irrelevant to R in this case. 
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When R R≥ , the OEM starts to profit from selling to recyclers. When R increases the 
OEM’s total profit in two periods oΠ  also increases.  
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 R
0.000025
0.00005
0.000075
0.0001
0.000125
0.00015
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ΠR
 
Figure 8 Reseller’s profit with changing R 
 The reseller’s profit does not change if R is smaller than the threshold value R . 
However as R increases to greater than R , the OEM will raise the unit wholesale price 
w to force reseller buy less so as to sell some products to the recyclers, leading to a 
decreased profit of the reseller. When R reaches $0.04*300=$12 the reseller will not 
buy anything from the OEM because w is too high, therefore forced to quit the market. 
 If we compare the values of the reseller’s profit and the OEM’s profit, we can 
see the reseller’s profit is much less than the OEM’s profit. This is because the 
reseller’s profit is subject to 1) the return rateτ , 2) unit wholesale price w, 3) and 
customers’ relative willingness-to-payδ . Particularly, a large part of the reseller’s 
marginal cost goes to the unit wholesale price w. This is in accordance with Bhuie et al. 
(2004), where the acquisition cost is significantly larger than the processing cost.  
Because the OEM controls the used product supply, a large part of revenue from 
refurbished products goes to the OEM because of the high unit wholesale price. The 
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reseller might seek other sources of used product supply to reduce the collection cost. 
Numerous literature deals with closed loop supply chains where both the OEM and the 
reseller collect used product. We do not elaborate such case in our thesis. Instead, we 
want to focus on the decisions of the OEM and show how reselling can be a profiting 
strategy for the OEM after collection. 
3.4.2 Variation with δ  
Now let’s explore how the relative willingness-to-pay δ would affect the profits, 
prices and production quantity decisions of OEM and reseller. Again, we use the data 
set: nC =$60/300=0.2, rC =$6/300=0.02, cC =$6/300=0.02, τ =0.06, R=$3/300=0.01 
while changingδ . 
 We want to focus on the case where new and used products co-exist in the 
market. From the condition 2 of Proposition 1: 2 2n r n rC C R C Cδ δ+ − − < < −  we can 
see the condition for both products to exist in market is 2 2r r n
n
R C C R C
C
δ+ < < + + − . 
With the above set of parameter values we know that δ should be from the range of 
(0.15, 1.63). Note that 0 1δ< < , we perform the sensitivity analysis in (0.15,1)δ ∈ . 
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Figure 9 OEM’s total profit from two periods with changing δ  
Observation 1: The OEM’s profit increases when the customers value more for the 
refurbished products. 
This may seem counter intuitive to the conventional belief that when the customers 
value the refurbished products more, the OEM’s profit would decrease. Indeed, because of 
the competition the OEM’s new product sales are reduced. However, in our model, because 
the OEM sets the unit wholesale price w, the OEM can benefit from customer’s higher 
valuation for refurbished products by charging the reseller more for each used product. The 
profit from selling collected products is large enough to compensate the loss of new product 
sales due to competition. That is to say, the OEM still manages to increase profit by allowing 
both new and refurbished products in the market.  
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Figure 10 Reseller’s profit with changing δ  
The reseller’s profit increases whenδ  increases. This is understandable because if the 
customers are willing to pay more for the refurbished products, the reseller would make more 
profits by selling at a higher price. We can observe a critical value of δ =0.26. When δ δ<  
the reseller’s profit increases faster than when δ δ≥ . As demonstrated in Figure 12, when 
δ δ<  the reseller’s sales quantity 2rq is not constrained by number of collected used 
products 1nqτ . That is to say, whenδ δ< , if δ increases, both the price and the demand of the 
refurbished products would increase. Whenδ δ≥ , only the price of refurbished products 
increase, resulting in a slower growth of reseller’s profit. 
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Figure 11 Unit wholesale price w with changing δ  
This picture shows how the OEM would charge the reseller more for each collected 
product when δ increases. The increased profit from w compensates loss in OEM’s 
decreasing new product sales in the second period. 
 
Figure 12 Resell rate with changing δ  
We can observe the threshold value of δ =0.26. whenδ δ≥  the resell rate would 
become 1, meaning the OEM will sell all the collected products to the reseller. This is 
because the OEM is constantly comparing the margin of: 
1) selling to the recyclers. 
2) selling to the reseller 
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When 0.15δ ≥ , the OEM can get more margin from selling to the reseller by 
charging a high w. Therefore the OEM will sell all the collected products to the reseller. 
The above results are based on the assumption that the OEM is the only collector of 
used products in the market. Asδ increases, the margin from refurbished product increases. 
As a result, many individual collectors would try to acquire these used products directly. On 
seeing this, the OEM must take actions such as increasing the investment in advertising or 
raising the buyback price from the customers. We do not consider the entry of independent 
collectors to stay focused on the competition between the powerful OEM and the reseller. 
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CHAPTER 4.  CENTRALLY COORDINATED MODEL (CC MODEL) 
In the previous chapter we discussed the OEM-Reseller model where the OEM does 
not participate in product resale directly, but chooses to sell to the resellers. In some 
industries, especially copy machine and automobile industries, many companies are actively 
recovering and selling remanufactured products, For example at Caterpillar, more than 
$1billion revenue is generated from its remanufactured parts line “Reman” in 2005, and is 
expected to grow by 15% annually (Forbes 2005). In this chapter we use the centrally 
coordinated model as a benchmark to evaluate OEM’s performance in the OEM-Reseller 
model. 
4.1  Model Configuration 
 
Figure 13 Illustration of the Centrally Coordinated model 
The key assumptions and notations in this model are the same as those in the OEM-
Reseller model in chapter 3 except OEM and reseller act coordinately in CC model. We use 
central planner to stand for the coordinated body of OEM and reseller in the following 
OEM OEM/Reseller 
1nq
2nq1nqτ 2rq
1st Period 2nd Period 
Recycle 
1 2n rq qτ −
  
 
48
context. In the first period the central planner produces 1nq  cell phones. In the second period, 
after the central planner collects 1nqτ  used products, the central planner refurbishes 2rq  of 
them, and sells them along side with 2nq  units of new products in second period. 
To further simplify the model, let’s first assume the fixed set up cost from initiating 
the resale program is zero for the central planner. This is because it does not affect any price 
or quantity decision (Majumder and Groenevelt 2001). 
4.2  Model Derivation 
Again since this is a sequential optimization, let’s use backwards induction to find the 
central planner’s optimal production strategies. 
4.2.1 Second Period 
The central planner maximizes its profit in the second period by setting the 
production quantities 2nq  and 2rq : 
2 , 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1
2 2 2 1
Max  (1 ) ( (1 ) ) ( )
s.t.     0, 0,
n r
C n r n n n r r r n r c nq q
n r r n
q q C q q q C q R q q C q
q q q q
δ δ τ τ
τ
Π = − − − + − − − + − −
≥ ≥ ≤
 (4.1) 
The Lagrangean is 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1
1 2 2 2
(1 ) ( (1 ) ) ( )
         ( )
C n r n n n r r r n r c n
n r r n
L q q C q q q C q R q q C q
q q q q
δ δ τ τ
λ τ μ ρ
= − − − + − − − + − −
+ − + +
 (4.2) 
SOSC: The Hessian Matrix is 
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2 2
2 2
2
2 2 2
2 2
2 2
2
2 2 2
2 2
2 2
C C
n n r
C C
r n r
L L
q q q
H
L L
q q q
δ
δ δ
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ − −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ − −∂ ∂ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
-2<0, 2δ− <0, | | 4 (1 )H δ δ= − >0, therefore Hessian Matrix is negative-definite and 
the central planner’s profit is strictly concave in ( 2nq , 2rq ). As a result, the SOSC is satisfied. 
FONC: 
2 2
2 2
2 2 1 2
0, 0
0, 0, 0
0, 0, ( ) 0
C C
n r
n r n r
L L
q q
q q q q
λ ρ μ
ρ μ λ τ
∂ ∂= =∂ ∂
≥ ≥ ≥
= = − =
    (4.3) 
There are six possible cases: 
Case1: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< > >  
Case2: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< = >  
Case3: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ= = >  
Case4: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ= > >  
Case5: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< > =  
    Case6: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< = =  
 Now let’s solve for the solution in each case that satisfies FONC respectively. 
Case1: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< > >  
From FONC (4.3) we have 0λ = , 0μ = , and 0ρ = . Solving (4.3) yields 
2
1
2(1 )
n r
n
C C Rq δδ
− + + −= −     (4.4) 
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2 2 (1 )
n r
r
C C Rq δ δ δ
− −= −      (4.5) 
Conditions: 
From 2 1r nq qτ< ,  
12 (1 )
n r
n
C C R qδ τδ δ
− − <−      (4.6) 
From 2 0nq > ,  
(1 )r nR C Cδ> − − −      (4.7) 
From 2 0rq > , 
n rR C Cδ< −       (4.8) 
Reorganize (4.6), (4.7), and (4.8) we have the conditions for Case 1 solution to hold 
is: 
12 (1 )
n r
n
C C R qδ τδ δ
− − <−  and (1 )r n n rC C R C Cδ δ− − − < < −   (4.9) 
Case2: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< = >  
From FONC (4.3) we have 0, 0λ μ= = . 
Solving (4.3) yields 
2 2
r
r
C Rq δ δ
− −=      (4.10) 
(1 )r nC R Cρ δ= − − − −     (4.11) 
From 2 1r nq qτ< , 
12
r
n
C R qδ τδ
− − <      (4.12) 
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From 2 0rq > , 
rR Cδ< −       (4.13) 
From 0ρ ≥ , 
(1 )r nR C Cδ≤ − − −      (4.14) 
Since if (4.14) is satisfied, (4.13) is automatically satisfied, the conditions for case 2 
solution to hold is: 
12
r
n
C R qδ τδ
− − <  and (1 )r nR C Cδ≤ − − −    (4.15) 
Case3: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ= = >  
From FONC (4.3) we have 0μ = . 
Solving (4.3) yields: 
12r nC R qλ δ δτ= − − + −     (4.16) 
11 2n nC qρ δτ= − + +      (4.17) 
From 0λ ≥  and (4.16), 
12
r
n
C R qδ τδ
− − ≥      (4.18) 
From 0ρ ≥  and (4.17), 
1
1
2
n
n
Cqτ δ
−≥       (4.19) 
In order for (4.18) and (4.19) both hold, 1
2 2
nr CC Rδ
δ δ
−− − ≥ , equivalent to 
(1 )r nR C Cδ≤ − − −      (4.20) 
Therefore the conditions for case 3 solution to hold are 
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1
1
2 2
nr
n
CC R qδ τδ δ
−− − ≥ ≥  and (1 )r nR C Cδ≤ − − −   (4.21) 
Case4: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ= > >  
From FONC (4.3) we have 0, 0μ ρ= =  
Solving (4.3) yields 
2 1
1
2
n
n n
Cq qδτ−= −      (4.22) 
1( 2 (1 ))r n nC R C qλ δ τ δ= − − + − −    (4.23) 
From 0λ ≥ , 
12 (1 )
n r
n
C C R qδ τδ δ
− − ≥−      (4.24) 
From 2 0nq > , 
1
1
2
n
n
C qτδ
− >       (4.25) 
For (4.24) to hold, 
n rC C Rδ − >       (4.26) 
Therefore the conditions for Case 4 solution to hold are: 
1
1
2
n
n
C qτδ
− >  if (1 )r nR C Cδ≤ − − −  or,   (4.27) 
12 (1 )
n r
n
C C R qδ τδ δ
− − ≥−  if (1 )n r r nC C R C Cδ δ− > > − − −   (4.28) 
Case5: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< > =  
From FONC (4.3) 0, 0λ ρ= = . 
Solving (4.3) yields 
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2
1
2
n
n
Cq −=       (4.29) 
r nC R Cμ δ= + −      (4.30) 
Since 2 0rq =  and 1nq >0, 2 1r nq qτ<  is satisfied. 
2 0nq >  is also satisfied because 0 1nC< <  
From 0μ ≥  and (4.30), 
n rC C Rδ − ≤       (4.31) 
So the constraint for Case5 solution to hold is (4.31). 
Case6: 2 1 2 2, 0, 0r n n rq q q qτ< = =  
From FONC (4.3), 0λ =  
Solving (4.3) yields 
1 nCρ = − +      (4.32) 
rC Rμ δ= + −                    (4.33) 
0ρ ≥  is violated because 1nC < . 
That is to say, Case6 will never hold. 
 
The results can be shown in the following table. 
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Proposition 3: There are two threshold values of R: lower threshold 
value (1 )r nL C Cδ= − − − , and higher threshold value n rH C Cδ= − .When R L≤ , the central 
planner might stop making new products in the second period and profit only through 
reselling. When L R H< < , both new and refurbished products will be in the market. 
When R H≥ , the central planner will recycle all the collected products. The optimal 
solutions in second period are shown in Table 6, 7, and 8. 
Table 6. Solution when R L≤  in CC model 
1nqτ  *2nq  *2rq  
1
1
2
n
n
Cqτ δ
−<  11 2
n
n
C qδτ− −  1nqτ  
1
1
2 2
n r
n
C C Rq δτδ δ
− − −≤ ≤  0 1nqτ  
12
r
n
C R qδ τδ
− − <  0 
2
rC Rδ
δ
− −  
 
Table 7. Solution when L R H< <  in CC model 
1nqτ  *2nq  *2rq  
1 2 (1 )
n r
n
C C Rq δτ δ δ
− −≤ −  1
1
2
n
n
C qδτ− −  1nqτ  
12 (1 )
n r
n
C C R qδ τδ δ
− − <−  
1
2(1 )
n rC C R δ
δ
− + + −
−  2 (1 )
n rC C Rδ
δ δ
− −
−  
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Table 8. Solution when R H≥  in CC model 
1nqτ  *2nq  *2rq  
any given value 1− Cn
2  
0 
 
 In practice, it is common for the company to produce both new and remanufactured 
products, as in the case with Caterpillar. Henceforth we focus on the case when L R H< <  in 
the first period derivation to solve for the optimal production quantity 1nq  . 
4.2.2 First Period  
 The central planner tries to maximize its total profit in two periods. Its 
optimization problem can be formulated as: 
1
* * * *
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
* * * * *
2 2 2 1 2 2
Max  ( ) (1 ) (1 )
                                     ( (1 ) ) ( )
n
C C n n n n n r n nq
n r r r c n n r
q q C q q q C q
q q C q C q R q q
δ
δ τ τ
Π +Π = − − + − − −
+ − − − − + −
 (4.34) 
Recall (1 )r n n rC C R C Cδ δ− − − < < − . There are two regions of 1nqτ : 
Region 1: 1 2 (1 )
n r
n
C C Rq δτ δ δ
− −≤ −  
2
* 2
2 1 1 1
(1 )( ) ( ) (1 )( )
4
n
C n n c r n n
Cq q C C C qτ δ δ δ τ−Π = − + − − −    (4.35) 
Region 2: 12 (1 )
n r
n
C C R qδ τδ δ
− − <−  
* 2
2 1
1
1( ) ((1 ) ( )( 2 )
4 (1 )
                 4 (1 )( )
C n n r r n
n c
q C C R C R C
q R C
δ δ δ δδ δ
δτ δ
Π = − + + − + + −−
+ − −
  (4.36) 
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 First we need to check that *2 1( )C nqΠ  is continuous at the boundary 
1nq = 2 (1 )
n rC C Rδ
τδ δ
− −
− . 
In region 1 when 1nq = 1nq ,  
* 2 2
2 1( ) ( (1 ) ( )( 2 )
                 +2C ( )) / (4(1 ) )
C n n r r n
c r n
q R C C C C
C R C
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ
Π = − + − + − + −
+ − −    (4.37) 
In region 2 when 1nq approximates 1nq , 
* 2 2
2 1( ) ( (1 ) ( )( 2 )
                 +2C ( )) / (4(1 ) )
C n n r r n
c r n
q R C C C C
C R C
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ
Π = − + − + − + −
+ − −    (4.38) 
(4.37) is equivalent to (4.38), therefore *2 1( )C nqΠ is continuous at 1nq . 
We then need to check if differentiable at 1nq : 
In region 1  
*
2
1
1
( ( 2(1 ) ))C c r n n
n
C C C q
q
τ δ δ τ∂Π = − − + − −∂  
when 1nq = 1nq , 
*
2
1
( )C c
n
R C
q
τ∂Π = −∂     (4.39) 
In region 2, 
*
2
1
( )C c
n
R C
q
τ∂Π = −∂     (4.40) 
(4.39) is equal to (4.40). So  *2 1( )C nqΠ  is continuous and differentiable in both regions. 
Lemma 3. *2 1( )C nqΠ  is concave in 1nq . 
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Proof: When 1 1n nq q≤ , (4.35) is strictly concave in 1nq .when 1 1n nq q> , (4.36) is linear 
in 1nq . 
2 *
2 1
2
1
( )
0
C n
n
q
q
∂ Π
≤∂  in both regions of 1nq , therefore 
*
2 1( )C nqΠ  is concave. 
Lemma 4: *1 2C CΠ +Π is strictly concave in 1nq . 
Proof: We have proved that *2CΠ is differentiable and concave.  
2
1
2
1
2 0C
nq
∂ Π = − <∂ ,
2 *
2 1
2
1
( )
0
C n
n
q
q
∂ Π
≤∂ , 
2 *
1 2 1
2
1
( ( ))
0
C C n
n
q
q
∂ Π +Π
<∂ . So 
*
1 2C CΠ +Π  is strictly 
concave. 
Now let’s solve the maximization problem of *1 2C CΠ +Π .The slope of 
*
1 2C CΠ +Π  at 1nq  is: 
1 2
1
1
(1 )
C C r n
n c
n
C R CC C R
q
δτ τ δτ δ
∂ Π +Π + −= − − + +∂ −    (4.41) 
 if (4.41)≤ 0, i.e.  
2
(( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ( 1 ) ))
1 ( 1 )
r c nC C CR δ δ τ τ δ τδ δτ
+ − + − + + − + − +≤ − + − +   (4.42) 
 Optimal production quantity *1nq  falls in region 1. 
 Solving FONC: 1 2
1
0C C
nq
∂ Π +Π =∂  yields 
 *1 2
1 ( )
2 2( 1 )
n c r n
n
C C C Cq δ τδ δτ
− + + + −= − + − +     (4.43) 
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The corresponding total profit of the central planner in two periods CΠ = 1 2C CΠ +Π = 
2
2
2 2 2 2
1 (2( 1 ) 2( 1 )( )
(4 4(1 ) )
(( ) (1 2 (1 )) ( 1 2 ) ) )
n n c r n
c r n n c r n
C C C C C
C C C C C C C
δ τδ δτ
δ δ τ
− + + − + + − ++ −
+ + + − + + + − +
 (4.44) 
if (4.41)> 0, i.e.  
2
(( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ( 1 ) ))
1 ( 1 )
r c nC C CR δ δ τ τ δ τδ δτ
+ − + − + + − + − +> − + − +   (4.45) 
Optimal production quantity *1nq  falls in region 2. 
 Solving FONC: 1 2
1
0C C
nq
∂ Π +Π =∂  yields 
 *1
1 (1 )
2n n c
q C C Rτ τ= − − +      (4.46) 
 The corresponding total profit of the central planner in two periods CΠ = 1 2C CΠ +Π = 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 ( 2 2( 1 ) 2 2 2
(4( 1 ) )
4 2( 1 )( )( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) )
r r n n r n
n n n c c
C C R R C C C C R
C C C C R C R
δ δ δ δδ δ
δ δ δ δτ δ δτ
− − − − − + + + +− +
− + + − + − − + + − − +
 (4.47) 
Proposition 4. If 2
(( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ( 1 ) ))
1 ( 1 )
r c nC C CR δ δ τ τ δ τδ δτ
+ − + − + + − + − +≤ − + − + , then 
*
1 2
1 ( )
2 2( 1 )
n c r n
n
C C C Cq δ τδ δτ
− + + + −= − + − + . Otherwise 
*
1
1 (1 )
2n n c
q C C Rτ τ= − − +  
4.3 Comparison between OR Model and CC Model 
Using CC model as a benchmark we would be able to analyze the performance of the 
OR model. Again we want to focus on the condition where both new products and 
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refurbished product exist. Therefore, we use the data set nC =$60/300=0.2, rC =$6/300=0.02, 
cC =$6/300=0.02, δ =0.3, τ =0.06, and we increase R from 0 to 0.04. 
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04R
0.3201
0.3202
0.3203
0.3204
0.3205Total Channel Profit
ΠO+ΠR in OR model
ΠC in CC model
 
Figure 14 Comparison of total channel profit 
Figure 14 shows the total channel profit’s change with increasing R. The dashed line 
represents the sum of OEM’s total profit in two periods OΠ  and reseller’s profit RΠ  in OR 
model. The solid line represents the central planner’s total profit in both periods in CC model. 
We can observe two threshold values of R: ORR =0.016 and CCR =0.030. When ORR R≤ , all 
the collected used products are sent for reselling in both CC model and OR model. Because 
none of the collected used products are sent for recycling, the profit of both players is 
irrelevant with R in this region. When R is between ORR and CCR , the OEM sends some of 
the collected used products for recycling in OR model, yet still send all of them for reselling 
in CC model. If R is large so that 0.04CCR R< ≤ , the OEM will sent some used products for 
recycling in both CC model and OR model. Fewer products are sent for reselling when R 
increases. If R continues to increase beyond 0.04, the OEM will not send any collected used 
products for reselling, and recycle all of them in both OR model and CC model.  
  
 
61
In figure 14 the total channel profit in OR model appears to be the same as OEM’s 
profit in CC model if ORR R≤ . However, it can be calculated that  
2 4 2
2 2 2
[1 ( ) ] 0
4[1 (2 ) ] [1 (1 ) ]
n n c r
C O R
C C C Cδ τ δ τ
δ δτ δ δτ
− + − −Π −Π −Π = >+ − + −  
 So when ORR R≤ , the total channel profit in CC model is higher than that in OR 
model. The difference is very small given the current set of parameter values we use (to the 
order of 10-7), therefore from the figure the two curves for total channel profit seems to be 
converging.  
When 0.04ORR R< ≤ , the total profit of OEM and Reseller in OR model is less than 
OEM’s profit in CC model. When R reaches 0.04 OR model converge with CC model 
because reseller would be excluded from the market, leaving only OEM selling new products. 
Since the CC model usually yields the highest possible channel profit, we may use it 
as a benchmark to judge the efficiency of the OR model. The closer the total channel profit in 
OR model is to the CC model, the higher efficiency it is. From Figure 14 we can see that the 
difference between OR model and CC model is very small when the OEM sells all the 
products to the resellers in both models ( ORR R< ). As the value of R increases, difference 
between the two models first increases, the decreases. When R reaches 0.04, the OEM sells 
all the used products to the recyclers. Because the reseller is excluded from the market, OR 
model and CC model is the same when 0.04R ≥ . 
Note the value of the total channel difference is small. This is because the OEM is so 
powerful that it can control the decision of the reseller. Most of the channel profit goes to the 
OEM in the OR model. Therefore the efficiency of the OR model appears to be very high.     
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0.3201
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0.3203
0.3204
0.3205ΠO
ΠO in OR model
ΠC in CC model
 
Figure 15 Comparison of OEM’s total profits in two periods 
The central planner in CC model makes more profit than the OEM in OR model. This 
is reasonable because by assuming zero set-up cost, the supply chain is always most efficient 
in the centrally coordinated model. However, we can see that as R increase, the difference 
between CC model and OR model decreases. This means when R increases, the OEM would 
be able to collect more profit from the channel. 
 
Figure 16 Comparison of resell rate 
As discussed in Chapter 3, when ORR R< , OEM will sell all the collected used 
products to the reseller in OR model. Similarly in CC model the OEM will resell all the 
collected used products from period 1 if CCR R< . When R increases, the OEM starts to sell 
some of the collected used products for reselling. From this figure we can see that given a 
value of R, the resell rate in CC model is higher or equal to that in OR model. That is to say, 
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the OEM finds reselling more profitable than recycling for a larger range in CC model given 
the current set of parameter values. It can be calculated analytically that, 
CC ORR R− = 2 2[1 ( ) ]1 [3 2 (2 )(1 ) ]
nC Cn Cc Crδτ δ τ
δτ δ δ δ δτ
− + − −
+ − + − − ,    (4.48) 
because 2 21 [3 2 (2 )(1 ) ]δτ δ δ δ δτ+ − + − − >0, if [1 ( ) ] 0n n c rC C C Cδτ δ τ− + − − >  
CC ORR R> , and our observation that given R, the resell rate in CC model is at least as large 
as that in OR model holds. Numerically, within reasonable range of parameter values 
(4.48)>0. The difference between CCR and ORR decreases when collection cost Cc or 
refurbishing cost Cr increases, implying the OEM (or central planner) will favor less for 
reselling. 
 
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04R
0.175
0.176
0.177
0.178
0.179
p2r
OR model
CC model
 
Figure 17 Comparison of refurbished product price in second period 
When the R is small, OEM sells all the collected products to the reseller, the retail 
price is almost the same in both CC model and OR model. When R is large, the price of the 
refurbished products increases in both CC model and OR model, yet it is lower in OR model.   
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Figure 18 Comparison of new product price in second period 
The retail price of new products in the second period is the same in both CC model 
and OR model. 
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04R
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Figure 19 Comparison of new product price in first period 
The new product price in CC model would be less than that in OR model in the first 
period. This is because the central planner would be able to sell more in this period in CC 
model compared to OR model. Even though the price is smaller, the total profit is still higher 
because of the larger sales volume in CC model. 
In conclusion, in the CC model the OEM enjoys higher profit than in OR model. The 
customers would also benefit from CC model because of the cheaper price of products in 
each period.  
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
5.1 Conclusions 
This thesis extends Ferguson and Toktay’s model by proposing a OEM-Reseller 
model. In this model, the OEM collects used products and sells them to either the reseller or 
recyclers. This thesis shows under what conditions would the OEM decides 
1) Whether to allow refurbished products in the market or not. 
2) Whether to sell all the collected products to the reseller or not. 
In each condition the equilibrium retail prices and production quantities decisions are 
calculated using the two-period Stackelberg game with non-negativity and inequality 
constraints.  
This thesis analyzed how the equilibrium decisions of OEM and the reseller change 
with different values of price the recyclers pay for each used product sent for recycling R and 
customers’ relative willingness-to-payδ . Some interesting managerial insights are explored 
in the numerical examples. 
 The value of R directly affects OEM’s preference for resell or recycling. When R 
increases the OEM tend to be more inclined to sending the collected products for recycling. 
When R exceeds a threshold value the OEM will recycle all the collected products.  
If the OEM is able to control collection of used products, under some conditions it is 
more profitable for the OEM to sell these collected products to the reseller for reselling 
compared to recycling. This is quite contrary to the OEM’s traditional fear of loss in new 
product sales from the competition with refurbished products. The mathematical 
formulations of these conditions are given in proposition 1 and 3. 
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This thesis shows that if customers value refurbished products more, the OEM can 
profit from charging the reseller a higher wholesale price w. The increased profit from selling 
to the reseller exceeds the loss of profit of reduced new product sales, resulting in a increased 
profit of the OEM. 
We then compare the OEM-Reseller model with the centrally coordinated model by 
using numerical analysis. Focusing on the case where the OEM allows both new and 
refurbished products in the market we found that centrally coordinated model yields higher 
profit for the OEM and lower prices for the consumers than OEM-Reseller model.  
  
5.2 Discussion and Future Research 
The OEM-Reseller model can be extended in many ways. 
5.2.1 Infinite Period Game 
In this thesis we address the cell phone recovery problem by analyzing and 
comparing the profit from reselling and recycling. We focused on a specific model of cell 
phone which will no longer be of resale value after the second period. Our model can be 
extended in such a way that, if there exist stable collection flow and demand flow for 
refurbished cell phones, an infinite period game would be able to capture the cell phone 
recovery process of general cell phone models. To be specific, the refurbished phones can be 
returned and refurbished for a second time; The new products can be collected after the 
second period. This kind of infinite period game can be used in products that can be 
remanufactured many times, such as single-use-cameras. 
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5.2.2 Collection Rate τ  as a Decision Variable    
 The OEM can increase the collection rate by investing more in collection, such as 
advertising or providing higher incentives for each returned cell phone. If we can model the 
collection cost as a function of collection rate, we would be able to find the optimal 
collection rate for the OEM under which the OEM achieves maximized profit. This would 
give us a more comprehensive understanding of OEM’s recovery strategies. 
5.2.3 Environmental Subsidies from the Government 
We have demonstrated in the previous numerical examples that, if the price recyclers 
pay to the OEM for each unit of collected product sent for recycling R increases, the resell 
rate would decrease. It is interesting to analyze how the government’s subsidy for recycling, 
reselling, collection would affect the OEM’s optimal recovery strategies. The government 
can be added as a player who sets up environmental policies to achieve maximum social 
welfare of the supply chain. Using the extended OEM-Reseller model we would be able to 
find the optimal subsidy the government should provide. 
 5.2.4 Stochastic Model 
We analyze the closed loop supply chain using deterministic models. For example, 
we derive the simple inverse demand function by assuming customers’ willingness-to-pay is 
uniformly distributed. In this way we are able to analyze the relationship between the OEM 
and the reseller without unnecessary computational complexities.  
However, few things in real life can be captured by simple deterministic models. To 
make our findings more accurate we may use stochastic models for the analysis. For example, 
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Ferguson and Koeningsberg (2007) uses a random variable u to capture the uncertainty in 
customers’ willingness-to-pay. The OEM-Reseller model in this thesis can be extended in 
such a fashion.  
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APPENDIX A.  COMPARISON TABLE OF OR MODEL AND CC 
MODEL 
OR model( R R≤ ) OR model( R R> ) 
R  2
(( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ( 2 ) ))
1 ( 2 )
r c nC C Cδ δ τ τ δ τ
δ δτ
+ − + − + + − + − +
− + − +
 
OΠ  
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2(2 2 22 2 2(4 8 4 )
22 ( 1 ) 2 (1 ( 1 ) )
2 2 22 (2 2 ( 1 ) ( 1 )))
C C Cr c r
C C Cc r n
C C Cn c r
τ τ τ δτ δ τ
δτ δ τ
τ τ δ τ τ
δτ δτ δ τ τ δτ τ δτ
− + + + −
+ −
+ − + + + − +
− − + − + − + + − +
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 ( 2 4( 1 )
4( 2 )
2 2 2 4
2( 1 )( )( 2 ) ( ) ( 2 ) )
r r n
n r n n n
n c c
C C R R C
C C C R C C
C C R C R
δδ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
δ δτ δ δτ
− − − − − +− +
+ + + − +
+ − + − − + + − − +
RΠ  
2 2
2 2
( 1 ( ) )
4( 1 ( 2 ) )
n c r nC C C Cδτ δ τ
δ δτ
− + + + −
− + − +
 2
2
( )
4( 2 )
r nC R C δ
δ δ
+ −
− +
 
w 
2
1 ( 2 (
2
2( 2 ) ( 1 ( ) ))
2 2( 2 )
r n
n c r n
C C
C C C C
δ δ
δ τ δ τ
δ δτ
− + + +
− + − + + + −
− + − +
 1 ( )
2 r
C R δ− + +  
1np  2
1 ( )1
2 2( 2 )
n c r nC C C C δ τ
δ δτ
− + + + −− − + − +
 1 (1 )
2 n c
C C Rτ τ+ + −  
2np  
1
2
nC+  1
2
nC+  
2rp  
2
1 ( ( 1 (1 (1 ( 1 )) )
( 2 2( 2 ) )
(1 ( ) ( 1 ( 2 ) ))))
n
c r c r
C
C C C C
δ δ τ τδ δτ
τ τ δ δ τ
− − + + − +− + − +
+ − + + − + − + + +
( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 )
2( 2 )
r nC R Cδ δ δ δ
δ
− + + − + + − − +
− +
 
2nq  
2
1 ( 1 (1
2 2( 2 )
(2 ) ) (1 ( 1 2 )))c r nC C C
δτδ δτ
δ τ δτ τ
− + −− + − +
+ + − + + − +
 2 2
4 2
n rC C R δ
δ
− + + −
−  
2rq  2
( 1 ( ) )
2 2( 2 )
n c r nC C C Cτ δ τ
δ δτ
− + + + −
− + − +
 
24 2
r nC R C δ
δ δ
+ −
− +  
1nq  2
1 ( )
2 2( 2 )
n c r nC C C C δ τ
δ δτ
− + + + −
− + − +
 1 (1 )
2 n c
C C Rτ τ− − +  
Table 9. Solution for OEM-Reseller model 
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CC model( R R≤ ) CC model( R R> ) 
R  2
(( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ( 1 ) ))
1 ( 1 )
r c nC C Cδ δ τ τ δ τ
δ δτ
+ − + − + + − + − +
− + − +
 
OΠ  
2
2
2 2
2 2
1 (2( 1 )
(4 4(1 ) )
2( 1 )( ) (( ) (1
2 (1 )) ( 1 2 ) ) )
n
n c r n c r n
n c r n
C
C C C C C C C
C C C C
δ δτ
δ τ
δ δ τ
− + ++ −
− + + − + + + +
− + + + − +
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 ( 2 2( 1 )
(4( 1 ) )
2 2 2 4
2( 1 )( )( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) )
r r n
n r n n n
n c c
C C R R C
C C C R C C
C C R C R
δδ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
δ δτ δ δτ
− − − − − +− +
+ + + − +
+ − + − − + + − − +
1np  2
1 ( )
2 2( 1 )
n c r nC C C C δ τ
δ δτ
− + + + −
− + − +  
1 (1 )
2 n c
C C Rτ τ− − +  
2np  
1
2
nC+  1
2
nC+  
2rp  
2
1 ( ( 1 ( 1 ( 1 ) )
2 2( 1 )
( 1 ) ( 1 ( ) )))
n
c r
C
C C
δ δ τδ δτ
δ τ δ τ
− + − + − + +− + − +
− + − + + + 2
rC R δ+ +  
2nq  2
2 ( 1 ( ) )1 (1 )
2 2 2( 1 )
n c r n
n
C C C CC δτ δ τδ δτ
− + + + −− − − + − +
 1
2 2
n rC C R δ
δ
− + + −
−  
2rq  2
( 1 ( ) )
2 2( 1 )
n c r nC C C Cτ δ τ
δ δτ
− + + + −
− + − +  22 2
r nC R C δ
δ δ
+ −
− +  
1nq  2
1 ( )
2 2( 1 )
n c r nC C C C δ τ
δ δτ
− + + + −
− + − +  
1
2
n cC C Rτ τ− − +  
Table 10. Solution for Centrally Coordinated Model 
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APPENDIX B.  DERIVATION OF THE INVERSE DEMAND FUNCTION 
In assumption 4 we assumed the customers’ willingness-to-pay ϕ  is uniformly 
distributed between the interval [0,1]. We also normalized the market size to 1. Now we will 
be able to derive each customer’s net utility (NU) following Desai and Purohit(1998): 
1 2
2
  or ,  if bought a new product in period 1 or 2 respectively,
            ,                 if bought a resold product in period 2,           
            0,                           
n n
r
NU p p
p
ϕ ϕ
δϕ
= − −
−
 if didn't buy anything.
 
First let’s first derive the inverse demand function in the first period. In this period, a 
customer has only two choices: Get a new product(N) or get nothing(X). The quantity of 
customers is the market size, in this case 1, times the probability of a customer getting a 
positive net utility. The distribution of customers can be illustrated as follows: 
 
 Considering the the customer who’s indifferent between N and X, at 0ϕ he/she gets 
the same net utility from choosing N and X: 
 0 1 0npϕ − =       (B.1) 
 yields  0 1npϕ =             (B.2) 
1 0
1
1*(1 )
     1
n
n
q
p
ϕ= −
= −            (B.3) 
Inverse demand function is: 
1 1 1( ) 1n n np q q= −          (B.4) 
ϕ X N 
0ϕ0 1 
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Now let’s look at period 2. A customer faces three options: buy new product(N), 
buy refurbished product(R), buy nothing(X). Similarly we can illustrate the situation 
below: 
 
 If all three strategies are observed in equilibrium, then consumers who follow a 
N strategy value the product more than consumers who follow a R strategy, who value it 
more than consumers who follow an X strategy. (Ferguson and Toktay 2006) 
 Now consider the customer who is indifferent between X and R at point 1ϕ . 
He/she gets the same net utility from choosing X and R: 
1 2 0rpδϕ − =      (B.5) 
yields 21 r
pϕ δ=     (B.6) 
 Then we consider the customer who is indifferent between N and R, at point 2ϕ . 
He/she gets the same net utility from choosing N and R: 
2 2 2 2n rp pϕ δϕ− = −             (B.7) 
Solving (B.7) we have 
2 2
2 1
n rp pϕ δ
−= −         (B.8) 
Therefore the number of customers are: 
ϕ X N 
2ϕ
R 
1ϕ0 1 
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2 2
2 2 1
1*(1 )
1*( )
n
r
q
q
ϕ
ϕ ϕ
= −
= −     (B.9) 
 Solving (B.6) ,(B.8) and (B.9) we have the inverse demand functions: 
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
( , ) 1
( , ) (1 )
n n r n r
r n r n r
p q q q q
p q q q q
δ
δ
= − −
= − −     (B.10) 
 Notice the different effects of the relative willingness-to-pay δ on the 
prices. Given the production quantities, when δ increases, the price of refurbished 
products increases to take advantage of the increased willingness-to-pay. However, 
the price of new products decreases as the two products become closer substitutes 
and there is more competition, i.e. the cannibalization effect. (Ferguson and Toktay 
2006) 
proof: If all three strategies are observed in equilibrium, then consumers who follow a N 
strategy value the product more than consumers who follow a R strategy, who value it 
more than consumers who follow an X strategy.  
 This is equivalent to proving the net utility of customers with willingness-
to-pay 2ϕ ϕ>  is larger if he/she chooses N than choosing R, and net utility of 
customers with willingness-to-pay 1ϕ ϕ>  is larger if he/she chooses R than being 
inactive X. 
For customers with 2ϕ ϕ>  
 NU from N is 2npϕ −                    (B.11) 
 NU from R is 2rpδϕ −                (B.12) 
 (B.11)-(B.12) yields 
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2 2(1 ) ( )n rp pδ ϕ− − −      (B.12) 
When 2ϕ ϕ> , substitute(B.8) into this inequality (B.12) becomes 
2 2 2 2 2(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 0n r n rp p p pδ ϕ δ ϕ− − − > − − − =   (B.13) 
 Hence the net utility of customers with willingness-to-pay 2ϕ ϕ>  is larger 
if he/she chooses N than choosing R. 
For customers with 1ϕ ϕ>  
 NU from R is 2rpδϕ −                (B.14) 
 NU from X is 0                 (B.15) 
 (B.14)-(B.15) yields 
2rpδϕ −       (B.16) 
 When 1ϕ ϕ> , from (B.6) 
2 1 2 0r rp pδϕ δϕ− > − =     (B.17) 
 That is to say, net utility of customers with willingness-to-pay 1ϕ ϕ>  is 
larger if he/she chooses R than being inactive X. 
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